Tag Archives: World Cup

Fourth Place: Uruguay

Psrhea, Sports,

What Went Right?  A very rigidly and tactically disciplined team. This was one team nobody was going to take out of their game. Two things carried them to the top four: (1) an almost total reliance on opposition mistakes in the attacking end both mental and physical to take advantage of offensively, and (2) an almost total reliance on one star player to carry them. Long stretches of tactical tedium were rewarded with quick strikes resulting in exciting scores, so they were actually kind of fun to watch. Didn’t attack in numbers but the players they did send forward on the counter got into the attacking end very well. Did a pretty good job of holding up the ball on the attacking end even though they didn’t have numbers forward. Stayed compact in the back and in midfield, and didn’t let even the best sides stretch them. Through the group phase were one of the two or three best defenses in the tournament; they never lost their defensive shape, read the game well, interrupted a lot of attacking thrusts before they got into their penalty area, stayed in front of the ball, could be physical when they needed to, and most importantly intercepted a lot of opposition passes in midfield (which led to many quick and effective counterattacks). One of the better teams at set pieces and arguably the best at free kicks and long-range shots on goal. From a viewing standpoint, they played by far the most exciting game in the tournament in the quarterfinals. Not to cast aspersions on their performance and finish, but they took advantage of a weak group draw and surprisingly weak end of their knockout round bracket. No matter how weak their draw was Uruguay still had to perform — and did. I’m just saying…

What Went Wrong?  Two things did them in once they got to the semifinals: (1) an almost total reliance on opposition mistakes in the attacking end both mental and physical to take advantage of offensively, and (2) an almost total reliance on one star player to carry them. As long as they were playing the likes of South Africa, Mexico, a French side that was imploding before our very eyes, South Korea, and Ghana, this worked. Against top-tier championship-quality teams like the Netherlands and Germany, however, it wasn’t nearly enough. Against those two world football powers — with their intricate and otherworldly direct attacking and finishing abilities, sustained passing and ball possession, and competent defenders who could take players on one-on-one without having to pack the back – Uruguay’s reliance on mistakes and counterattacks was only going to work up to a point. Uruguay needed a much more concerted, orchestrated and sustained offensive approach other than their one-dimensional, solely east-west counterattack – and they didn’t have it. And worst of all, the Netherlands’ and Germany’s attacks left Uruguay pinned in their own end and under siege. All of a sudden, that disciplined defense that gave up no goals in group play and only two goals through the quarterfinals came unglued under the incessant onslaught and gave up six goals in their last two games. It wouldn’t have mattered if the one player they were relying on the carry them was Pele’, much less Diego Forlan; they weren’t going to win a world championship under those conditions.

Who Stepped Up To The Plate?  Who else? Diego Forlan. In a World Cup loaded with superstars who didn’t show up, Forlan was the surprise Golden Ball winner and best single player in the tournament. Going into the World Cup Forlan was going to be relied upon to be the focal point of their offensive approach (such as it was) and primary finisher. He was that and more. Playing in back and to the right of the target man and with the freedom to roam, Forlan was everywhere and did everything from dropping back in defense, getting the ball behind the half-touch line and bringing it forward (even on the flank), creating chances, servicing the target man, and even taking all the free kicks (which just gave away one of Uruguay’s primary weaknesses; Forlan is the kind of world-class finisher you usually want on the end of those free kicks, not the guy you want taking them). Without Forlan, target man Luis Suarez doesn’t get the service to score three crucial goals. Fernando Muslera was stellar in goal (interesting how it is the four goalkeeper that performed the best in this tournament all made it to the semifinals). Diego Lugano and Martin Caceres weren’t the biggest central defenders but they played big in front of goal, and Uruguay couldn’t have gotten to the semis without them. Decent defending on the rear flanks for Diego Godin and Jorge Fucile. Martin Periera and Diego Perez kept the defensive discipline intact just in front of the backline. Edinson Cavani was decent getting forward and making a good counterattacking triumvirate with Suarez and Forlan. Uruguay got some much-needed bench help from Sebastien Abreu, Alvaro Pereira, Walter Gargano, Alvaro Fernandez, and Nicolas Lodiero.

Who Didn’t Show Up?  Can’t really say anybody didn’t do what they were expected to do. Uruguay got a total team effort from everyone they put on the pitch. That they didn’t have the wherewithal to do better was a function of tactics, system and approach, not individual performances.

How Was The Coaching?  Pretty damn steady. Not unlike Vicente del Bosque with Spain, Oscar Tabarez went with a system he thought would get them through the grind of the long South American World Cup qualification campaign as well as the four-week tournament itself, got the players he needed to buy in and execute it, and stuck with it through thick and thin. As long as the players maintained his tactical rigidity he was convinced it would work. And it pretty much did until they ran into a teams with championship pedigrees. It got Uruguay their best finish since 1970, so I guess he did a pretty good job and there really isn’t much to complain about.

Did They Finish Where They Were Expected?  Clearly not. The surprise team in the tournament with the easy knockout round draw, Uruguay finished in fourth place. Nobody saw that coming. Ya gotta tip your hat off to these guys. Well done!

What Now?  As pleased as the team and country should be about their finish – and they really should celebrate it – there really isn’t a lot to get excited about the two-time winners of the World Cup going forward. Forlan is 31 so this is probably his last World Cup. Outside of Suarez there really isn’t a whole lot of star-quality talent on the ground in Uruguay, and a lot of their current players will be past their prime to be of any use in four years. They really shouldn’t kid themselves: With the teams they got to face before the semis they caught lightning in a bottle. Uruguay has relied on a tactically stifling defense and not much else for more than 12 years now and just happened to get lucky this time out. I just hope that they don’t confuse what happened in South Africa with progress and continue to maintain their tactical and technical system beyond this World Cup under the mistaken belief that with it they will now become international contenders, but given their recent history I suspect that is exactly what they’ll do.

5. Argentina

Psrhea, Sports,

What Went Right?  Fantastic movement off the ball, and more times than not they employed a surprisingly patient offensive buildup, something you didn’t see in previous incarnations of this side. Took take advantage of space, with combination passing that sustained attacks and ball possession. Made efficient use of east-west, north-south, and diagonal runs and passes. They were very good at beating the offside trap and getting behind the opposition backline, and were even better at finding cracks in the defense to exploit. Spread the opposition by frequently switching play. Got fantastic service into the box, and because they played with three finisher up front running into the box every time they took a shot, they were the best in the tournament at creating multiple shots on goal on the rebound. When not in possession they did a good job of maintaining tactical discipline and rigidity. Midfield was pretty good at interrupting the opposition attack, so Argentina also was pretty adept at sudden counterattacks. Defense on the flanks was pretty decent and got surprising close-down play from the fullbacks. They got very good use out of their bench. Bottom line: They tactically played typical Argentine football.

What Went Wrong?  Didn’t make any changes in approach or personnel on the rare occasions when things weren’t working, and in their quarterfinal exit to Germany, things went horribly wrong. Quite frankly, Argentina couldn’t make the necessary changes because this team was a one-trick pony: Get the ball to Lionel Messi and everybody else get the hell out of the way. No side in this tournament leaned so heavily on one player. Trying to get one magical, blessed-by-God player to carry a team to a championship in the era of tactical rigidity and discipline and the total team whole is greater than the sum of its parts concept is just a fool’s errand. It looks good and is pleasing to watch, but like the W-M and 2-3-5 formations it just doesn’t work anymore. Until the quarterfinals teams tried to shut down Messi. It didn’t work because it created space for Carlos Tevez and Gonzalo Higuain to do their thing. Plus, Messi just has the unmatched ball skills to break down multiple defenders, so closing him down just wasn’t cutting it. But Germany didn’t waste time trying to close down Messi. Instead Joachim Loew had his two star defensive midfielders Sami Khedira and Bastien Schweinsteiger cut off Messi’s service. That is, Germany interrupted the Argentine attack before it could even get the ball to Messi. When that happened, Argentina was lost. They couldn’t get anybody to be the focal point of the attack because THEY DIDN’T HAVE ANYBODY ELSE! What’s more, when Germany or anybody else was able to interrupt the Argentine attack in the midfield, the quick counterattack was able to reveal just how soft the center of Argentina’s defense really was.

Who Stepped Up To The Plate?  Carlos Tevez and Gonzalo Higuain were one of the two or three best strike partnerships in the tournament. They were able to get on the end of fantastic service in the box and were Johnny-on-the-spot on put-backs. Lionel Messi didn’t raise his game to legendary status like most of us thought he would and Argentina was counting on, but he was everywhere and did everything. Messi created virtually all of the Albiceleste attack, so if it wasn’t for him Tevez and Higuain don’t score their goals. It fell on Javier Mascherano to provide cover for the backline (God knows they needed it) and Juan Sebastian Veron to capably orchestrate the attack, and they performed capably. Fullbacks Gabriel Heinze and Jonas Gutierrez did a fine job covering the wings in the back. I liked the contributions Nicolas Burdisso, Clemente Rodriguez, Nicolas Otamendi, Diego Milito, Martin Palermo and Sergio Aguero made coming off the bench

Who Didn’t Show Up?  If it wasn’t for Mascherano and Veron then we would have found out a lot sooner about how soft and deficient Walter Samuel and Martin DeMichelis really were in front of goal (a shame really; both used to be world-class centers). Sergio Romero is just another in a long line of Argentine goalkeepers going back close to 20 years who are mediocre and best and do nothing to get you wins. Angel di Maria and Maxi Rodriguez could have taken the attacking onus off of Messi some if they had been just a little better at making inroads down the flanks, but they didn’t. Even though Messi sublime ball skills create a lot of space and chances for his forward partners – and he did take a lot of shots himself – he just wasn’t able to put the ball in the net. If he had scored just one or two goals and everything else being equal, that probably would have been enough to put a scare in Argentina’s knockout round opponents, changed the complexion of those games and arguably gotten them to July 11. Just a thought.

How Was The Coaching?  To say the least, flamboyant and colorful. By far the most popular coach in this tournament was Diego Maradona – and he lived up to his ostentatious persona. More passionate fan and loveable motivator to his charges than football tactician, Maradona gladly accepted the onus of getting the Albiceleste a World Cup, if not having the technical wherewithal. More mad hatter than cerebral thinker, Maradona’s antics did have a purpose: He took all the attention, and in the process kept his players from having to feel the pressure of expectations. His over-the-top exuberance and constant bear hugs put his players at ease, and created a stable team. But the pure passion, energy and motivation he relied on could only take them so far. As the Germans clinically and mercilessly picked his midfield apart, Maradona had no answers because (1) in making Messi the absolute focal point of the attack he did not have anybody else on his roster to take up the onus if Messi got shut down (“Where Have You Gone, Juan Roman Riquelme?” – sung to the tune of the famous Simon & Garfunkel song), and (2) Maradona himself didn’t have the tactical know-how to figure out what to do. As much as we all loved having El Diego around to make life interesting, I’d have to say at the end of the day his deficient roster choices combined with his lack of X’s and O’s means his coaching performance overall was seriously lacking.

Did They Finish Where They Were Expected?  Well, I thought that Messi was going to become this otherworldly legend, put the side on his shoulders, and win the World Cup in spite of Maradona’s lack of tactical know-how. Clearly I was wrong. I think most observers, however, had them finishing about where they did. Of course, the people of Argentina certainly are disappointed with this finish.

Now What?  Sorry, Argentina, but as much as you revere Diego Maradona, unless he learns the world-class intricacies of coaching tactical and technical football, then he has to go. Messi can still be the focal point of the attack but you would do well to get him some creative help both in the center and on the flank. Do something to develop a goalkeeper that at least approaches the consistency of the last good one you had at this level, Sergio Goycochia. And for God sakes get some decent central defenders.

6. Brazil

Psrhea, Sports,

What Went Right?  Even with a more tactically disciplined 4-5-1 formation — which played more like a 4-4-1-1 linkup — that got away from the traditionally elegant 4-2-2-2 they’ve historically played, Brazil still managed to employ it in a way that was “La Joga Bonita”. Extraordinary service from the flanks, and not just from the two midfield halves, but also from the fullbacks – and the two fullbacks put paid to the fact that any Brazilian player can score from anywhere. Attacked with both directness and flair; Brazil was the best in the tournament at making the Route One work. Pretty decent aerial ability for most of the tournament. The two front men were as good as any in the tournament, frequently getting behind the backline, getting on the end of very good service, and taking quality shots on target. The forwards were so good at finding space in the penalty area that opposing defenders frequently found themselves having to take them on one-on-one and, predictably, getting broken down by their omnipotent ball skills. Because their backline has surprising size they played with a certain physicality this side had not shown in past World Cups, making sure their opponents knew they were going to take people on. Surprising defensive positioning, reading of the game, and aerial ability in the back, and they were able to shut down opposition approaches on the flanks. For most of the tournament Brazil did a really good job of keeping the opposition from getting into the box with any regularity.

What Went Wrong?  This side had a surprising and disturbing idiosyncrasy of getting the lead and then mailing it in from there. Even thought they never dropped back in defense in numbers, but it’s as if they would get a lead, let their defenders handle the ugly stuff, and then relax going forward with the notion that whoever they were playing just wouldn’t put up much of a fight thereafter. The synthesis of this probably germinated from their coach, Dunga, having done such a good job of instilling a defensive backbone in them that they mistakenly figured that one goal early and maybe a second one late was enough. As good as they were at taking set pieces they were surprisingly bad at defending them and in the end it really, really mattered. Most of all, the one person they identified as their talisman just never got off the schneid. Outside of Dani Alves Brazil got surprising little from their bench.

Who Stepped Up To The Plate?  Target man Luis Fabiano and linkup man Robinho took a backseat to no other forward tandem in this tournament. Kaka was a key provider just behind the two forwards. Maicon was one of the two or three best fullbacks in the tournament and has earned every accolade as one of the best there is, while his counterpart on the left, Michel Bastos, didn’t contribute nearly as much in attack but was just as proficient in the back. Felipe Melo and Gilberto Silva were their usual stout just in front of the backline, but what made them both invaluable was their ability to contribute both distribution and added scoring going forward. Lucio and Juan were a vast improvement physically over previous center back tandems. Why it is they couldn’t get Dani Alves on the pitch for every game is beyond me.

Who Didn’t Show Up?  Julio Cesar, their goalkeeper touted pre-tournament as one of the best in the world, was just so-so. As much as I admired Lucio and Juan for their reading of the game and their renewed physicality, when it came time to defend set pieces they just plain stunk. Brazil expected Kaka to be their Messi; he was just as disappointing.

How Was The Coaching?  What it is we’ve come to expect from Dunga these last four years. Considering he was one of the greatest elegantly creative players in Brazilian football history, Dunga belied his playing philosophy and as a coach instilled a decidedly European backbone and mentality into this side defensively without sacrificing the elegant dance that is instinctive. It actually worked for the most part. What must be noted is that however increasingly accurate the Dutch were getting with their passing and offensive buildup in the quarterfinals, it was set pieces that did in Brazil, not the run of play. Dead-ball strategy, both in attack and defense, had become one of the main strengths of this Brazilian side since Dunga took over. However, against the Dutch, it cost them the match. Can’t really blame Dunga for that. But you know how Brazilians are: “We didn’t win because we didn’t play our Beautiful Game so the coach must go.” Not much you can do about that.

Did They Finish Where They Were Expected?  Do I really need to answer this?

Now What?  This is Brazil. They’re going to win international tournaments no matter who coaches them and what approach they take. They get the next World Cup in 2014. So understand something right now: On home soil they will be under the most extreme amount of pressure like they’ve never been before. They have no choice but to lift that trophy in Rio de Janeiro, no matter what it takes.