What Went Right? Man, did these guys attack! They put the pedal to the medal and ran forward all day long. Utilized a decidedly furious direct attack as opposed to an attractive, flashy attack with a orchestrated buildup. Used all of the field but made headway into the final third by using the flanks, where they had most of their possession. Chile probably spent more time in their opponent’s end of the pitch than any other team in this competition. More of an east-west team than a north-south team but they still managed to use their speed to find space and get forward very quickly. Chile didn’t wait for mistakes or lapses of concentration by their opponents; one way or another they were going to waste no time getting the ball into their opponent’s end, whether by counter or by design. Actually did a good job of getting a lot of service into the penalty area to the front players. Let’s not kid ourselves: Chile got Honduras in their first game and only beat the best defense in the world in Switzerland because they were a man down. It’s not like it was 6 hard-fought points.
What Went Wrong? Chile’s attack was so frenetic and manic that it was devoid of any semblance of quality, organization, creativity, refinement and inventiveness whatsoever. For all their possession they didn’t switch play very well, preferring to maintain forward progress on one flank or the other or through the center. Service and through balls into the box were just as frenzied. The front men exhibited hardly any polished ability to get on the end of balls. Ran into space but to what end? It looked more like they were making it up as they went along. What’s left unsaid about Chile’s furious attack was that it was employed in an attempt to mask their defensive ineptitude. It took next to nothing for Chile’s rearguard to lose any semblance of shape, discipline or rigidity, and when they got behind, their backline parted like a whore’s honey pot.
Who Stepped Up To The Plate? This side was all about its midfield. Jorge Valdivia was the focal center of the frenetic Chilean midfield, and he got no end of possession and attacking help from winger Matias Fernandez, Jean Beausejour (who was allowed to roam just behind the target man), Rodrigo Millar attacking the box from the center, on the flanks and Arturo Vidal and Mauricio Isla from the rear. Mark Gonzalez was a midfield goal poacher off the bench. Claudio Bravo was pretty decent in goal.
Who Didn’t Show Up? Fullbacks Isla and Vidal and center backs Gary Medal and Waldo Ponce were just atrocious in the back; they had no vision, no anticipation or reading of the game, no physicality, and couldn’t mark anybody. Carlos Carmona was less than inept just in front of the backline, Alexis Sanchez was practically ignored as a target man and finisher. Outside of Gonzalez I wasn’t really sure what Chile was trying to accomplish with anybody else they brought off the bench.
How Was The Coaching? There is a reason Argentine Marcelo Bielsa is called “El Loco”. One of the most successful coaches in Argentine history, after taking over Chile he installed the classic Argentine 3-3-1-3 formation and scored more goals in qualifying than any South American side. Problem was they also gave up more goals than any other side in South American qualifying. So we really shouldn’t be surprised that Bielsa didn’t have the players or the discipline to make it work more attractively.
Did They Finish Where They Were Expected? Most people had Chile coming out of this group, so enamored they were of their fun attack. I must admit I didn’t; I thought Switzerland’s omnipotent defense would nullify Chile and at least get them to the knockout round. Clearly I was wrong.
Now What? Hopefully Chile will keep Bielsa, and he will instill a little more discipline, elegance and tactical acuity to a team that is clearly ready to attack with abandon. First, though, he might want to find some reliable defenders who won’t lose their discipline, shape and organization in the back, and aren’t afraid to take people on.